Improper Null Termination
Weakness ID: 170 (Weakness Base)Status: Incomplete
+ Description

Description Summary

The software does not terminate or incorrectly terminates a string or array with a null character or equivalent terminator.

Extended Description

Null termination errors frequently occur in two different ways. An off-by-one error could cause a null to be written out of bounds, leading to an overflow. Or, a program could use a strncpy() function call incorrectly, which prevents a null terminator from being added at all. Other scenarios are possible.

+ Time of Introduction
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

C

C++

Platform Notes

Conceptually, this does not just apply to the C language; any language or representation that involves a terminator could have this type of problem.

+ Common Consequences
ScopeEffect
Confidentiality
Integrity

The case of an omitted null character is the most dangerous of the possible issues. This will almost certainly result in information disclosure, and possibly a buffer overflow condition, which may be exploited to execute arbitrary code.

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

If a null character is omitted from a string, then most string-copying functions will read data until they locate a null character, even outside of the intended boundaries of the string. This could:

  • cause a crash due to a segmentation fault

  • cause sensitive adjacent memory to be copied and sent to an outsider

  • trigger a buffer overflow when the copy is bering written to a fixed-size buffer

Integrity
Availability

Misplaced null characters may result in any number of security problems. The biggest issue is a subset of buffer overflow, and write-what-where conditions, where data corruption occurs from the writing of a null character over valid data, or even instructions. A randomly placed null character may put the system into an undefined state, and therefore make it prone to crashing. A misplaced null character may corrupt other data in memory

Access Control

Should the null character corrupt the process flow, or affect a flag controlling access, it may lead to logical errors which allow for the execution of arbitrary code.

+ Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following code reads from cfgfile and copies the input into inputbuf using strcpy(). The code mistakenly assumes that inputbuf will always contain a NULL terminator.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: C 
#define MAXLEN 1024
...
char *pathbuf[MAXLEN];
...
read(cfgfile,inputbuf,MAXLEN); //does not null terminate
strcpy(pathbuf,input_buf); //requires null terminated input
...

The code above will behave correctly if the data read from cfgfile is null terminated on disk as expected. But if an attacker is able to modify this input so that it does not contain the expected NULL character, the call to strcpy() will continue copying from memory until it encounters an arbitrary NULL character. This will likely overflow the destination buffer and, if the attacker can control the contents of memory immediately following inputbuf, can leave the application susceptible to a buffer overflow attack.

Example 2

In the following code, readlink() expands the name of a symbolic link stored in the buffer path so that the buffer filename contains the absolute path of the file referenced by the symbolic link. The length of the resulting value is then calculated using strlen().

(Bad Code)
Example Language: C 
char buf[MAXPATH];
...
readlink(path, buf, MAXPATH);
int length = strlen(filename);
...

The code above will not behave correctly because the value read into buf by readlink() will not be null terminated. In testing, vulnerabilities like this one might not be caught because the unused contents of buf and the memory immediately following it may be NULL, thereby causing strlen() to appear as if it is behaving correctly. However, in the wild strlen() will continue traversing memory until it encounters an arbitrary NULL character on the stack, which results in a value of length that is much larger than the size of buf and may cause a buffer overflow in subsequent uses of this value. Buffer overflows aside, whenever a single call to readlink() returns the same value that has been passed to its third argument, it is impossible to know whether the name is precisely that many bytes long, or whether readlink() has truncated the name to avoid overrunning the buffer. Traditionally, strings are represented as a region of memory containing data terminated with a NULL character. Older string-handling methods frequently rely on this NULL character to determine the length of the string. If a buffer that does not contain a NULL terminator is passed to one of these functions, the function will read past the end of the buffer. Malicious users typically exploit this type of vulnerability by injecting data with unexpected size or content into the application. They may provide the malicious input either directly as input to the program or indirectly by modifying application resources, such as configuration files. In the event that an attacker causes the application to read beyond the bounds of a buffer, the attacker may be able use a resulting buffer overflow to inject and execute arbitrary code on the system.

Example 3

While the following example is not exploitable, it provides a good example of how nulls can be omitted or misplaced, even when "safe" functions are used:

(Bad Code)
Example Language: C 
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main() {

char longString[] = "String signifying nothing";
char shortString[16];

strncpy(shortString, longString, 16);
printf("The last character in shortString is: %c %1$x\n", shortString[15]);
return (0);
}

The above code gives the following output: The last character in shortString is: l 6c So, the shortString array does not end in a NULL character, even though the "safe" string function strncpy() was used.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
CVE-2000-0312Attacker does not null-terminate argv[] when invoking another program.
CVE-2003-0777Interrupted step causes resultant lack of null termination.
CVE-2004-1072Fault causes resultant lack of null termination, leading to buffer expansion.
CVE-2001-1389Multiple vulnerabilities related to improper null termination.
CVE-2003-0143Product does not null terminate a message buffer after snprintf-like call, leading to overflow.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Requirements

Use a language that is not susceptible to these issues. However, be careful of null byte interaction errors (CWE-626) with lower-level constructs that may be written in a language that is susceptible..

Phase: Implementation

Ensure that all string functions used are understood fully as to how they append null characters. Also, be wary of off-by-one errors when appending nulls to the end of strings.

Phase: Implementation

If performance constraints permit, special code can be added that validates null-termination of string buffers, this is a rather naive and error-prone solution.

Phase: Implementation

Switch to bounded string manipulation functions. Inspect buffer lengths involved in the buffer overrun trace reported with the defect.

Phase: Implementation

Add code that fills buffers with nulls (however, the length of buffers still needs to be inspected, to ensure that the non null-terminated string is not written at the physical end of the buffer).

+ Weakness Ordinalities
OrdinalityDescription
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class20Improper Input Validation
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ChildOfCategoryCategory169Technology-Specific Special Elements
Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class707Improper Enforcement of Message or Data Structure
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory730OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOfCategoryCategory741CERT C Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
ChildOfCategoryCategory748CERT C Secure Coding Section 50 - POSIX (POS)
Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard734
CanPrecedeWeakness BaseWeakness Base120Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
Research Concepts1000
CanPrecedeWeakness VariantWeakness Variant126Buffer Over-read
Research Concepts1000
PeerOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base463Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel
Research Concepts1000
PeerOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base464Addition of Data Structure Sentinel
Research Concepts1000
CanAlsoBeWeakness VariantWeakness Variant147Improper Sanitization of Input Terminators
Research Concepts1000
MemberOfViewView630Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE
Weaknesses Examined by SAMATE (primary)630
CanFollowWeakness BaseWeakness Base193Off-by-one Error
Research Concepts1000
CanFollowWeakness ClassWeakness Class682Incorrect Calculation
Research Concepts1000
+ Relationship Notes

Factors: this is usually resultant from other weaknesses such as off-by-one errors, but it can be primary to boundary condition violations such as buffer overflows. In buffer overflows, it can act as an expander for assumed-immutable data.

Overlaps missing input terminator.

+ Causal Nature

Explicit

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERImproper Null Termination
7 Pernicious KingdomsString Termination Error
CLASPMiscalculated null termination
OWASP Top Ten 2004A9CWE More SpecificDenial of Service
CERT C Secure CodingPOS30-CUse the readlink() function properly
CERT C Secure CodingSTR03-CDo not inadvertently truncate a null-terminated byte string
CERT C Secure CodingSTR32-CNull-terminate byte strings as required
+ White Box Definitions

A weakness where the code path has:

1. end statement that passes a data item to a null-terminated string function

2. start statement that produces the improper null-terminated data item

Where "produces" is defined through the following scenarios:

1. data item never ended with null-terminator

2. null-terminator is re-written

+ Maintenance Notes

As currently described, this entry is more like a category than a weakness.

+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
PLOVERExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Time of Introduction
2008-08-01KDM AnalyticsExternal
added/updated white box definitions
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Applicable Platforms, Causal Nature, Common Consequences, Description, Likelihood of Exploit, Maintenance Notes, Relationships, Other Notes, Relationship Notes, Taxonomy Mappings, Weakness Ordinalities
2008-11-24CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common Consequences
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative Examples
2009-07-17KDM AnalyticsExternal
Improved the White Box Definition
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common Consequences, Other Notes, Potential Mitigations, White Box Definitions
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description
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