Incorrect Calculation |
Weakness ID: 682 (Weakness Class) | Status: Draft |
Description Summary
Extended Description
When software performs a security-critical calculation incorrectly, it might lead to incorrect resource allocations, incorrect privilege assignments, or failed comparisons among other things. Many of the direct results of an incorrect calculation can lead to even larger problems such as failed protection mechanisms or even arbitrary code execution.
Scope | Effect |
---|---|
Availability | If the incorrect calculation causes the program to move into an unexpected state, it may lead to a crash or impairment of service. |
Integrity Availability | If the incorrect calculation is used in the context of resource allocation, it could lead to an out-of-bounds operation (CWE-119) leading to a crash or even arbitrary code execution. Alternatively, it may result in an integer overflow (CWE-190) and / or a resource consumption problem (CWE-400). |
Access Control | In the context of privilege or permissions assignment, an incorrect calculation can provide an attacker with access to sensitive resources. |
Other | If the incorrect calculation leads to an insufficient comparison (CWE-697), it may compromise a protection mechanism such as a validation routine and allow an attacker to bypass the security-critical code. |
Example 1
The following image processing code allocates a table for images.
This code intends to allocate a table of size num_imgs, however as num_imgs grows large, the calculation determining the size of the list will eventually overflow (CWE-190). This will result in a very small list to be allocated instead. If the subsequent code operates on the list as if it were num_imgs long, it may result in many types of out-of-bounds problems (CWE-119).
Example 2
This code attempts to calculate a football team's average number of yards gained per touchdown.
Example 3
This example, taken from CWE-462, attempts to calculate the position of the second byte of a pointer.
In this example, second_char is intended to point to the second byte of p. But, adding 1 to p actually adds sizeof(int) to p, giving a result that is incorrect (3 bytes off on 32-bit platforms). If the resulting memory address is read, this could potentially be an information leak. If it is a write, it could be a security-critical write to unauthorized memory-- whether or not it is a buffer overflow. Note that the above code may also be wrong in other ways, particularly in a little endian environment.
Phase: Implementation Understand your programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation. Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how your language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. |
Phase: Implementation Strategy: Input Validation Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range. |
Phase: Implementation Use the appropriate type for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. |
Phase: Architecture and Design Strategies: Language Selection; Libraries or Frameworks Use languages, libraries, or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences. Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). |
Phase: Testing Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible. |
Phase: Testing Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results. |
Nature | Type | ID | Name | View(s) this relationship pertains to![]() |
---|---|---|---|---|
ChildOf | ![]() | 189 | Numeric Errors | Development Concepts (primary)699 |
ChildOf | ![]() | 738 | CERT C Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT) | Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734 |
ChildOf | ![]() | 739 | CERT C Secure Coding Section 05 - Floating Point (FLP) | Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard734 |
ChildOf | ![]() | 752 | 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management | Weaknesses in the 2009 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)750 |
CanPrecede | ![]() | 170 | Improper Null Termination | Research Concepts1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 128 | Wrap-around Error | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 131 | Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 135 | Incorrect Calculation of Multi-Byte String Length | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 190 | Integer Overflow or Wraparound | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 191 | Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 192 | Integer Coercion Error | Development Concepts (primary)699 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 193 | Off-by-one Error | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 369 | Divide By Zero | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 467 | Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 468 | Incorrect Pointer Scaling | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 469 | Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
MemberOf | ![]() | 1000 | Research Concepts | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
CanFollow | ![]() | 681 | Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types | Research Concepts1000 |
Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
---|---|---|---|
CERT C Secure Coding | FLP32-C | Prevent or detect domain and range errors in math functions | |
CERT C Secure Coding | FLP33-C | Convert integers to floating point for floating point operations | |
CERT C Secure Coding | INT07-C | Use only explicitly signed or unsigned char type for numeric values | |
CERT C Secure Coding | INT13-C | Use bitwise operators only on unsigned operands |
Submissions | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | Source | |
Internal CWE Team | ||||
Modifications | ||||
Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | Source | |
2008-07-01 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | External | |
updated Potential Mitigations, Time of Introduction | ||||
2008-09-08 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Relationships | ||||
2008-10-14 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Type | ||||
2008-11-24 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings | ||||
2009-01-12 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Applicable Platforms, Common Consequences, Demonstrative Examples, Description, Likelihood of Exploit, Potential Mitigations, Relationships | ||||
2009-03-10 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Potential Mitigations | ||||
2009-05-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Demonstrative Examples | ||||
2009-07-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Demonstrative Examples, Related Attack Patterns | ||||
2009-10-29 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Demonstrative Examples, Relationships |