Executive Summary

Informations
Name CVE-2024-56674 First vendor Publication 2024-12-27
Vendor Cve Last vendor Modification 2025-01-06

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3

Cvss vector : CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Overall CVSS Score 5.5
Base Score 5.5 Environmental Score 5.5
impact SubScore 3.6 Temporal Score 5.5
Exploitabality Sub Score 1.8
 
Attack Vector Local Attack Complexity Low
Privileges Required Low User Interaction None
Scope Unchanged Confidentiality Impact None
Integrity Impact None Availability Impact High
Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2

Cvss vector :
Cvss Base Score N/A Attack Range N/A
Cvss Impact Score N/A Attack Complexity N/A
Cvss Expoit Score N/A Authentication N/A
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores

Detail

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation point

When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c97c79 ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash cases for virtio-net.

This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine.

netdev_tx_reset_queue() can actually be dropped from virtnet_open path; the device is not stopped in any case. For BQL core part, it's just like traffic nearly ceases to exist for some period. For stall detector added to BQL, even if virtnet_close could somehow lead to some TX completions delayed for long, followed by virtnet_open, we can just take it as stall as mentioned in commit 6025b9135f7a ("net: dqs: add NIC stall detector based on BQL"). Note also that users can still reset stall_max via sysfs.

So, drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from virtnet_enable_queue_pair(). This eliminates the BQL crashes. As a result, netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. This patch adds it to immediately after free_unused_bufs(), following the rule of thumb: netdev_tx_reset_queue() should follow any SKB freeing not followed by netdev_tx_completed_queue(). This seems the most consistent and streamlined approach, and now netdev_tx_reset_queue() runs whenever free_unused_bufs() is done.

[1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace:

? die+0x32/0x80
? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0
? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
__free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net]
free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net]
virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net]
? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0
? update_curr+0x35/0x260
? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0
net_rx_action+0x329/0x420
? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0
handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0
do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0


__local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0
virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net]
__dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0
__dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250
dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60
do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0
? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0
? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
? netlink_unicas ---truncated---

Original Source

Url : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-56674

CWE : Common Weakness Enumeration

% Id Name
100 % CWE-672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release

CPE : Common Platform Enumeration

TypeDescriptionCount
Application 8
Os 3703

Sources (Detail)

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ddccbefebdbe0c4c72a248676e4d39ac66a8e26
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4294d4ac61fbb382811a1d64eaf81f446ce2af4
Source Url

Alert History

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Date Informations
2025-07-15 02:41:16
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2025-07-14 12:38:34
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2025-06-26 02:38:31
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2025-06-25 12:36:35
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2025-06-24 02:43:09
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2025-05-27 02:48:34
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2025-03-29 03:44:28
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2025-03-28 13:47:43
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2025-03-28 03:22:16
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2025-03-19 03:17:05
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2025-03-18 03:30:05
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2025-03-14 03:17:12
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2025-03-06 14:13:45
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2025-02-22 03:27:17
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2025-01-08 00:20:53
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2025-01-07 03:08:08
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2025-01-07 00:20:35
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2025-01-06 21:20:40
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2024-12-27 21:20:27
  • First insertion