Executive Summary
Informations | |||
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Name | CVE-2021-46929 | First vendor Publication | 2024-02-27 |
Vendor | Cve | Last vendor Modification | 2024-11-21 |
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3
Cvss vector : CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | |||
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Overall CVSS Score | 5.5 | ||
Base Score | 5.5 | Environmental Score | 5.5 |
impact SubScore | 3.6 | Temporal Score | 5.5 |
Exploitabality Sub Score | 1.8 | ||
Attack Vector | Local | Attack Complexity | Low |
Privileges Required | Low | User Interaction | None |
Scope | Unchanged | Confidentiality Impact | None |
Integrity Impact | None | Availability Impact | High |
Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores |
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2
Cvss vector : | |||
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Cvss Base Score | N/A | Attack Range | N/A |
Cvss Impact Score | N/A | Attack Complexity | N/A |
Cvss Expoit Score | N/A | Authentication | N/A |
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores |
Detail
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: use call_rcu to free endpoint This patch is to delay the endpoint free by calling call_rcu() to fix another use-after-free issue in sctp_sock_dump(): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 This issue occurs when asoc is peeled off and the old sk is freed after getting it by asoc->base.sk and before calling lock_sock(sk). To prevent the sk free, as a holder of the sk, ep should be alive when calling lock_sock(). This patch uses call_rcu() and moves sock_put and ep free into sctp_endpoint_destroy_rcu(), so that it's safe to try to hold the ep under rcu_read_lock in sctp_transport_traverse_process(). If sctp_endpoint_hold() returns true, it means this ep is still alive and we have held it and can continue to dump it; If it returns false, it means this ep is dead and can be freed after rcu_read_unlock, and we should skip it. In sctp_sock_dump(), after locking the sk, if this ep is different from tsp->asoc->ep, it means during this dumping, this asoc was peeled off before calling lock_sock(), and the sk should be skipped; If this ep is the same with tsp->asoc->ep, it means no peeloff happens on this asoc, and due to lock_sock, no peeloff will happen either until release_sock. Note that delaying endpoint free won't delay the port release, as the port release happens in sctp_endpoint_destroy() before calling call_rcu(). Also, freeing endpoint by call_rcu() makes it safe to access the sk by asoc->base.sk in sctp_assocs_seq_show() and sctp_rcv(). Thanks Jones to bring this issue up. v1->v2: |
Original Source
Url : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-46929 |
CWE : Common Weakness Enumeration
% | Id | Name |
---|---|---|
100 % | CWE-416 | Use After Free |
CPE : Common Platform Enumeration
Sources (Detail)
Alert History
Date | Informations |
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2025-06-26 01:51:23 |
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2025-06-25 12:15:38 |
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2025-06-24 01:55:52 |
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2025-05-27 13:06:56 |
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2025-03-29 02:56:51 |
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2025-03-28 13:27:13 |
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2025-03-28 02:41:49 |
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2025-03-18 02:49:40 |
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2025-03-14 02:39:45 |
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2025-01-08 02:34:37 |
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2025-01-07 02:34:14 |
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2024-12-25 02:33:31 |
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2024-12-12 02:35:59 |
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2024-11-25 09:26:44 |
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2024-11-21 21:24:27 |
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2024-11-14 02:31:29 |
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2024-11-09 02:32:15 |
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2024-10-26 02:30:13 |
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2024-10-25 02:31:54 |
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2024-10-23 02:31:19 |
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2024-10-03 02:27:51 |
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2024-10-02 02:26:17 |
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2024-09-04 02:25:48 |
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2024-08-22 02:24:18 |
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2024-08-02 13:30:42 |
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2024-08-02 01:27:15 |
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2024-04-10 21:27:31 |
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2024-02-27 17:27:28 |
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2024-02-27 13:27:25 |
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