Vulnerability Note VU#707943

Microsoft Windows based applications may insecurely load dynamic libraries

Overview

Some applications for Microsoft Windows may use unsafe methods for determining how to load DLLs. As a result, these applications can be forced to load a DLL from an attacker-controlled source rather than a trusted location.

I. Description

Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs) are executable software components that are incorporated into a program at run-time rather than when the program is compiled and linked. Functions included in these libraries can be loaded in different ways by an application. In the case of run-time dynamic linking, a module uses the LoadLibrary() or LoadLibraryEx() functions to load the DLL at run time. If the location of the DLL to be loaded is not specified (such as specifying a fully qualified path name) by the application, Microsoft Windows defines an order in which directories are searched for the named DLL. By default, this search order contains the current directory of the process.

If an attacker can cause an affected application to call LoadLibrary() while the application's current directory is set to one controlled by the attacker, that application may run the attacker's code from a specially named DLL also supplied in that directory. This can occur when the affected application opens a normal file typically associated with it from the attacker-controlled directory. The specific name of the DLL that an attacker would need to choose varies depending on the affected application.

II. Impact

A remote, unauthenticated attacker with the ability to supply a malicious DLL may be able to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. In the most likely exploit scenario, an attacker could host this malicious DLL on a USB drive or network share. The attacker-supplied code would be run with the privileges of the user of the affected application.

In some cases of affected applications, an attacker who already has access to a local folder on the system could use this vulnerability in a local application running with elevated privileges to escalate their own privileges on the system.

III. Solution

Apply a patch from the vendor

The vulnerability described generically above can be manifest in a variety of software products. Please see the Vendor Information section of this document for information about specific applications that may be affected by this issue.

For Developers:

Ensure that applications do not load libraries from insecure locations

Developers of applications for the Windows platform should ensure that their applications call SetDllDirectory() with a blank path before calling LoadLibrary() to ensure that the DLL is not loaded from the current directory. More information about how to load libraries securely can be found in the following Microsoft articles: Dynamic-Link Library Security and Another technique for Fixing DLL Preloading attacks.

For Administrators:

Disable loading of libraries from the current working directory

According to Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637:

Note This workaround requires installation of the tool described in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2264107.

Microsoft has released a tool which allows customers to disable the loading of libraries from remote network or WebDAV shares. This tool can be configured to disallow insecure loading on a per-application or a global system basis.

Customers who are informed by their vendor of an application being vulnerable can use this tool to help protect against attempts to exploit this issue.

After the update listed in KB article 2264107 has been installed, the following registry value can be used to remove the current working directory from the default DLL search order:

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSession Manager]
"CWDIllegalInDllSearch"=dword:ffffffff

Note that making this change may cause some applications to not behave properly.

Disable the WebClient service

According to Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637:

Disabling the WebClient service helps protect affected systems from attempts to exploit this vulnerability by blocking the most likely remote attack vector through the Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) client service. After applying this workaround, it will still be possible for remote attackers who successfully exploited this vulnerability to cause Microsoft Office Outlook to run programs located on the targeted user's computer or the Local Area Network (LAN), but users will be prompted for confirmation before opening arbitrary programs from the Internet.

To disable the WebClient Service, follow these steps:
1. Click Start, click Run, type Services.msc and then click OK.
2. Right-click WebClient service and select Properties.
3. Change the Startup type to Disabled. If the service is running, click Stop.
4. Click OK and exit the management application.

While this workaround does not remove the vulnerability, it does block an attack vector for this vulnerability.

Block outgoing SMB traffic

Block outgoing connections on ports 139/tcp, 139/udp, 445/tcp, and 445/udp at your network perimeter. Doing so will help prevent machines on the local network from connecting to SMB servers on the internet. While this does not remove the vulnerability, it does block an attack vector for this vulnerability.

Vendor Information

Vendor	Status	Date Notified	Date Updated
Abvent	Affected		2010-09-01
Adobe	Affected		2010-09-02
Apple Inc.	Affected		2010-08-30
Atomix Productions	Affected		2010-09-01
Autodesk, Inc	Affected		2010-09-02
Avast! Antivirus Software	Affected		2010-08-26
Bentley Systems	Affected		2010-09-02
Bitmanagement Software	Affected		2010-09-01
BitTorrent	Affected		2010-08-26
Cisco Systems, Inc.	Affected		2010-08-26
Corel Corporation	Affected		2010-08-30
CyberLink Corporation	Affected	2010-08-30	2010-08-30
DAEMON Tools	Affected		2010-08-30
DivX, Inc.	Affected		2010-08-30
EZB Systems	Affected		2010-09-01
Fengtao Software	Affected		2010-09-01
GFI Software, Inc.	Affected		2010-09-01
Gilles Vollant Software	Affected		2010-09-01
GRAPHISOFT	Affected		2010-09-01
HTTrack	Affected		2010-09-01
IBM Corporation	Affected		2010-09-01
Inkscape	Affected		2010-09-01
IZArc	Affected		2010-08-26
Maxthon	Affected		2010-09-01
Microchip Technology	Affected		2010-09-01
Microsoft Corporation	Affected		2010-09-02
Mozilla	Affected		2010-09-02
NetStumbler	Affected		2010-09-01
Nokia	Affected		2010-09-01
Nullsoft	Affected		2010-08-26
Opera	Affected		2010-08-26
PGP Corporation	Affected		2010-09-02
Pixia	Affected		2010-09-02
PKWARE	Affected		2010-08-26
RealNetworks, Inc.	Affected		2010-08-26
SiSoftware	Affected		2010-09-01
Smart Projects	Affected		2010-09-01
Sonic Solutions	Affected		2010-08-26
Sony Corporation	Affected		2010-09-01
SweetScape Software	Affected		2010-08-26
TeamViewer	Affected		2010-08-26
TechSmith Corporation	Affected		2010-08-26
TortoiseSVN	Affected		2010-09-01
Tracker Software	Affected		2010-09-02
VideoLAN	Affected		2010-08-26
VMware	Affected		2010-08-24
WinMerge	Affected		2010-09-01
Wireshark	Affected		2010-09-02
Wolters Kluwer	Affected		2010-09-02

References

http://www.cert.org/blogs/vuls/2008/09/carpet_bombing_and_directory_p.html
http://blog.mandiant.com/archives/1207
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Aa297182
http://blog.zoller.lu/2010/08/cve-2010-xn-loadlibrarygetprocaddress.html
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684175%28VS.85%29.aspx
http://www.acrossecurity.com/aspr/ASPR-2010-04-12-1-PUB.txt
http://www.acrossecurity.com/aspr/ASPR-2010-04-12-2-PUB.txt
http://www.acrossecurity.com/aspr/ASPR-2010-08-18-1-PUB.txt
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1699/discuss
http://blog.metasploit.com/2010/08/exploiting-dll-hijacking-flaws.html
http://blog.rapid7.com/?p=5325
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/research/tech-reports/2010/CSE-2010-2.pdf
https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/2269637.mspx
http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/david_leblanc/archive/2010/08/23/another-technique-for-fixing-dll-preloading-attacks.aspx
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2264107
http://www.guninski.com/officedll.html

Credit

Instances and variations of this vulnerability were independently discovered by a number of researchers, including Georgi Guninski; Simon Raner, Jure Skofic and Mitja Kolsek of ACROS Security; Taeho Kwon and Zhendong Su; H.D. Moore. Some vendor information comes from Secunia.

This document was written by Chad R Dougherty.

Other Information

Date Public:	98-03-18
Date First Published:	2010-08-25
Date Last Updated:	2010-09-23
CERT Advisory:
CVE-ID(s):	CVE-2010-1795
NVD-ID(s):	CVE-2010-1795
US-CERT Technical Alerts:
Metric:	64.12
Document Revision:	46