N/A - CVE-2025-37794

Executive Summary

Informations
Name	CVE-2025-37794	First vendor Publication	2025-05-01
Vendor	Cve	Last vendor Modification	2025-05-02

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3

Cvss vector : N/A
Overall CVSS Score	NA
Base Score	NA	Environmental Score	NA
impact SubScore	NA	Temporal Score	NA
Exploitabality Sub Score	NA

Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2

Cvss vector :
Cvss Base Score	N/A	Attack Range	N/A
Cvss Impact Score	N/A	Attack Complexity	N/A
Cvss Expoit Score	N/A	Authentication	N/A
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores

Detail

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: Purge vif txq in ieee80211_do_stop()

After ieee80211_do_stop() SKB from vif's txq could still be processed. Indeed another concurrent vif schedule_and_wake_txq call could cause those packets to be dequeued (see ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue()) without checking the sdata current state.

Because vif.drv_priv is now cleared in this function, this could lead to driver crash.

For example in ath12k, ahvif is store in vif.drv_priv. Thus if ath12k_mac_op_tx() is called after ieee80211_do_stop(), ahvif->ah can be NULL, leading the ath12k_warn(ahvif->ah,...) call in this function to trigger the NULL deref below.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffffc000000001
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
batman_adv: bat0: Interface deactivated: brbh1337
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[dfffffc000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 978 Comm: lbd Not tainted 6.13.0-g633f875b8f1e #114
Hardware name: HW (DT)
pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k]
lr : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x174/0x29b8 [ath12k]
sp : ffffffc086ace450
x29: ffffffc086ace450 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 1ffffff810d59ca4
x26: ffffff801d05f7c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 000000004000001e
x23: ffffff8009ce4926 x22: ffffff801f9c0800 x21: ffffff801d05f7f0
x20: ffffff8034a19f40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffff801f9c0958
x17: ffffff800bc0a504 x16: dfffffc000000000 x15: ffffffc086ace4f8
x14: ffffff801d05f83c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffb003a0bf03
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffb003a0bf02 x9 : ffffff8034a19f40
x8 : ffffff801d05f818 x7 : 1ffffff0069433dc x6 : ffffff8034a19ee0
x5 : ffffff801d05f7f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008
Call trace:
ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] (P)
ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x16c/0x260
ieee80211_queue_skb+0xeec/0x1d20
ieee80211_tx+0x200/0x2c8
ieee80211_xmit+0x22c/0x338
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x7e8/0xc60
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc4/0xee0
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023.isra.0+0x854/0x17a0
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023+0x124/0x488
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120
br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x120/0x4a8
__br_forward+0xe4/0x2b0
deliver_clone+0x5c/0xd0
br_flood+0x398/0x580
br_dev_xmit+0x454/0x9f8
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120
ip6_finish_output2+0xc28/0x1b60
__ip6_finish_output+0x38c/0x638
ip6_output+0x1b4/0x338
ip6_local_out+0x7c/0xa8
ip6_send_skb+0x7c/0x1b0
ip6_push_pending_frames+0x94/0xd0
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1a98/0x2898
inet_sendmsg+0x94/0xe0
__sys_sendto+0x1e4/0x308
__arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x140
do_el0_svc+0x110/0x280
el0_svc+0x20/0x60
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158

To avoid that, empty vif's txq at ieee80211_do_stop() so no packet could be dequeued after ieee80211_do_stop() (new packets cannot be queued because SDATA_STATE_RUNNING is cleared at this point).