Executive Summary
| Informations | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Name | CVE-2022-49440 | First vendor Publication | 2025-02-26 |
| Vendor | Cve | Last vendor Modification | 2025-02-26 |
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3
| Cvss vector : N/A | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Overall CVSS Score | NA | ||
| Base Score | NA | Environmental Score | NA |
| impact SubScore | NA | Temporal Score | NA |
| Exploitabality Sub Score | NA | ||
| Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores | |||
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2
| Cvss vector : | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Cvss Base Score | N/A | Attack Range | N/A |
| Cvss Impact Score | N/A | Attack Complexity | N/A |
| Cvss Expoit Score | N/A | Authentication | N/A |
| Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores | |||
Detail
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/rtas: Keep MSR[RI] set when calling RTAS RTAS runs in real mode (MSR[DR] and MSR[IR] unset) and in 32-bit big endian mode (MSR[SF,LE] unset). The change in MSR is done in enter_rtas() in a relatively complex way, since the MSR value could be hardcoded. Furthermore, a panic has been reported when hitting the watchdog interrupt while running in RTAS, this leads to the following stack trace: watchdog: CPU 24 Hard LOCKUP This happens because MSR[RI] is unset when entering RTAS but there is no valid reason to not set it here. RTAS is expected to be called with MSR[RI] as specified in PAPR+ section "7.2.1 Machine State": R1–7.2.1–9. If called with MSR[RI] equal to 1, then RTAS must protect Fixing this by reviewing the way MSR is compute before calling RTAS. Now a hardcoded value meaning real ---truncated--- |
Original Source
| Url : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-49440 |
Sources (Detail)
Alert History
| Date | Informations |
|---|---|
| 2025-02-26 17:20:31 |
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