Failure to Control Generation of Code ('Code Injection') |
Weakness ID: 94 (Weakness Class) | Status: Draft |
Description Summary
Extended Description
When software allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the software. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution.
Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues -- all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common -- i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.
Scope | Effect |
---|---|
Confidentiality | The injected code could access restricted data / files |
Authentication | In some cases, injectable code controls authentication; this may lead to a remote vulnerability |
Access Control | Injected code can access resources that the attacker is directly prevented from accessing |
Integrity | Code injection attacks can lead to loss of data integrity in nearly all cases as the control-plane data injected is always incidental to data recall or writing. Additionally, code injection can often result in the execution of arbitrary code. |
Accountability | Often the actions performed by injected control code are unlogged. |
Example 1
This example attempts to write user messages to a message file and allow users to view them.
While the programmer intends for the MessageFile to only include data, an attacker can provide a message such as:
which will decode to the following:
The programmer thought they were just including the contents of a regular data file, but PHP parsed it and executed the code. Now, this code is executed any time people view messages.
Notice that XSS (CWE-79) is also possible in this situation.
Phase: Architecture and Design Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code. |
Phase: Architecture and Design Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your software. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails. |
Phase: Implementation Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs (i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if you are expecting colors such as "red" or "blue." To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent whitelists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit(). |
Phase: Testing Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible. |
Phase: Testing Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results. |
Phase: Operation Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force you to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184). |
Nature | Type | ID | Name | View(s) this relationship pertains to![]() |
---|---|---|---|---|
ChildOf | ![]() | 74 | Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane ('Injection') | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ChildOf | ![]() | 691 | Insufficient Control Flow Management | Research Concepts1000 |
ChildOf | ![]() | 752 | 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management | Weaknesses in the 2009 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)750 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 95 | Improper Sanitization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection') | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 96 | Improper Sanitization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection') | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 621 | Variable Extraction Error | Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
ParentOf | ![]() | 627 | Dynamic Variable Evaluation | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
MemberOf | ![]() | 635 | Weaknesses Used by NVD | Weaknesses Used by NVD (primary)635 |
CanFollow | ![]() | 98 | Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP File Inclusion') | Development Concepts699 Research Concepts1000 |
Many of these weaknesses are under-studied and under-researched, and terminology is not sufficiently precise. |
Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | CODE | Code Evaluation and Injection |
Submissions | ||||
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Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | Source | |
PLOVER | Externally Mined | |||
Modifications | ||||
Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | Source | |
2008-07-01 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | External | |
updated Time of Introduction | ||||
2008-09-08 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Applicable Platforms, Relationships, Research Gaps, Taxonomy Mappings | ||||
2009-01-12 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Common Consequences, Demonstrative Examples, Description, Likelihood of Exploit, Name, Potential Mitigations, Relationships | ||||
2009-03-10 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Potential Mitigations | ||||
2009-05-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
updated Demonstrative Examples, Name | ||||
Previous Entry Names | ||||
Change Date | Previous Entry Name | |||
2009-01-12 | Code Injection | |||
2009-05-27 | Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection') | |||