Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Weakness ID: 354 (Weakness Base)Status: Draft
+ Description

Description Summary

The software does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or "checksums" of a message. This may prevent it from detecting if the data has been modified or corrupted in transmission.

Extended Description

: The failure to validate checksums before use results in an unnecessary risk that can easily be mitigated. The protocol specification describes the algorithm used for calculating the checksum. It is then a simple matter of implementing the calculation and verifying that the calculated checksum and the received checksum match. Failure to verify the calculated checksum and the received checksum can lead to far greater consequences.

+ Time of Introduction
  • Architecture and Design
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

All

+ Common Consequences
ScopeEffect
Authentication

Integrity checks usually use a secret key that helps authenticate the data origin. Skipping integrity checking generally opens up the possibility that new data from an invalid source can be injected.

Integrity

Data that is parsed and used may be corrupted.

Non-Repudiation

Without a checksum check, it is impossible to determine if any changes have been made to the data after it was sent.

+ Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

(Bad Code)
Example Languages: C and C++ 
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
servr.sin_port = htons(1008);
bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv));
while (1) {

memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG);
clilen = sizeof(cli);
if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==...) n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen);
}
(Bad Code)
Example Language: Java 
while(true) {
DatagramPacket packet = new DatagramPacket(data,data.length,IPAddress, port);
socket.send(sendPacket);
}
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

Ensure that the checksums present in messages are properly checked in accordance with the protocol specification before they are parsed and used.

+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class345Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class754Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
Research Concepts1000
PeerOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base353Failure to Add Integrity Check Value
Research Concepts1000
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
CLASPFailure to check integrity check value
+ Related Attack Patterns
CAPEC-IDAttack Pattern Name
(CAPEC Version: 1.4)
75Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
CLASPExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Time of Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common Consequences, Relationships, Other Notes, Taxonomy Mappings
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description, Other Notes
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-03-10Failure to Check Integrity Check Value
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