CWE 119

The generic term "memory corruption" is often used to describe the consequences of writing to memory outside the bounds of a buffer, when the root cause is something other than a sequential copies of excessive data from a fixed starting location (i.e., classic buffer overflows or CWE-120). This may include issues such as incorrect pointer arithmetic, accessing invalid pointers due to incomplete initialization or memory release, etc.

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Phase: Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language with features that can automatically mitigate or eliminate buffer overflows.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions. This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Phase: Build and Compilation

Run or compile your software using features or extensions that automatically provide a protection mechanism that mitigates or eliminates buffer overflows.

For example, certain compilers and extensions provide automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are built into the compiled code. Examples include the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice.

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms can only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, a buffer overflow attack can still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Phase: Implementation

Programmers should adhere to the following rules when allocating and managing their applications memory:

• Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify.

• When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.

• Check buffer boundaries if calling this function in a loop and make sure you are not in danger of writing past the allocated space.

• If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Phase: Operation

Use a feature like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). This is not a complete solution. However, it forces the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.

Phase: Operation

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (NX) or its equivalent. This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required.

Phase: Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate