Argument Injection |
Attack Pattern ID: 6 (Standard Attack Pattern Completeness: Complete) | Typical Severity: High | Status: Draft |
Summary
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
Attack Execution Flow
Discovery of potential injection vectors:
Using an automated tool or manual discovery, the attacker identifies services or methods with arguments that could potentially be used as injection vectors (OS, API, SQL procedures, etc.).
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Manually cover the application and record the possible places where arguments could be passed into external systems.
env-All2 Use a spider, for web applications, to create a list of URLs and associated inputs.
env-AllIndicators
ID type Indicator Description Environments 1 Positive Arguments are used by the application in exposed services or methods
env-All2 Inconclusive No parameters appear to be used.
env-All3 Negative Application does not use any inputs.
env-AllOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success A list of parameters, arguments to modify is identified.2 Success A list of URLs, with their corresponding parameters (POST, GET, COOKIE, etc.) is created by the attacker.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor velocity of page fetching in web logs. Humans who view a page and select a link from it will click far slower and far less regularly than tools. Tools make requests very quickly and the requests are typically spaced apart regularly (e.g. 0.8 seconds between them).2 Detective Create links on some pages that are visually hidden from web browsers. Using IFRAMES, images, or other HTML techniques, the links can be hidden from web browsing humans, but visible to spiders and programs. A request for the page, then, becomes a good predictor of an automated tool probing the application.3 Preventative Use CAPTCHA to prevent the use of the application by an automated tool.4 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be automated.
1. Attempt variations on argument content:
Possibly using an automated tool, the attacker will perform injection variations of the arguments.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Use a very large list of probe strings in order to detect if there is a positive result, and, what type of system has been targeted (if obscure).
env-All2 Use a proxy tool to record results, error messages and/or log if accessible.
env-AllIndicators
ID type Indicator Description Environments 1 Positive The application behaves like the injection has been a success.
env-All2 Inconclusive No result appears.
env-AllOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Failure It is possible to monitor the application and to see that the argument has been validated.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Preventative Actively monitor malicious inputs.2 Detective Monitor the services and/or methods uses of the arguments.
Abuse of the application:
The attacker injects specific syntax into a particular argument in order to generate a specific malicious effect in the targeted application.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Manually inject specific payload into targeted argument.
env-AllOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success The attacker observes desired effect.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 2 Preventative Actively monitor malicious inputs.3 Detective Monitor the services and/or methods uses of the arguments.
Target software fails to strip all user-supplied input of any content that could cause the shell to perform unexpected actions.
Software must allow for unvalidated or unfiltered input to be executed on operating system shell, and, optionally, the system configuration must allow for output to be sent back to client.
Description
A recent example instance of argument injection occurred against Java Web Start technology, which eases the client side deployment for Java programs. The JNLP files that are used to describe the properties for the program. The client side Java runtime used the arguments in the property setting to define execution parameters, but if the attacker appends commands to an otherwise legitimate property file, then these commands are sent to the client command shell.
Source http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/393696
Skill or Knowledge Level: Medium
The attacker has to identify injection vector, identify the operating system-specific commands, and optionally collect the output.
Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP.
Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell, instead treat user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a function that takes user input and converts it to applications specific types and values, stripping or filtering out all unauthorized commands and characters in the process.
Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharcters or other methods circumvent program input validation routines and shell access is attained then it is not running under a privileged account. chroot jails create a sandbox for the application to execute in, making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate privilege even in the case that a compromise has occurred.
Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a separate host, in the event of a compromise the audit log may be able to provide evidence and details of the compromise.
Malicious input delivered through standard input, the attacker inserts additional arguments on the application's standard interface
Varies with instantiation of attack pattern. Malicious payload either pass commands through valid paramters or supply metacharacters that cause unexpected termination that redirects to shell
Enables attacker to execute server side code with any commands that the program owner has privileges to, this is particularly problematic when the sprogram is run as a system or privileged account.
CWE-ID | Weakness Name | Weakness Relationship Type |
---|---|---|
77 | Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | Targeted |
146 | Improper Neutralization of Expression/Command Delimiters | Targeted |
184 | Incomplete Blacklist | Targeted |
78 | Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') | Targeted |
185 | Incorrect Regular Expression | Targeted |
713 | OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A2 - Injection Flaws | Targeted |
697 | Insufficient Comparison | Targeted |
Nature | Type | ID | Name | Description | View(s) this relationship pertains to |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ChildOf | Attack Pattern | 137 | Parameter Injection | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 15 | Command Delimiters | Mechanism of Attack1000 |
Submissions | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Submitter | Organization | Date | ||
G. Hoglund and G. McGraw. Exploiting Software: How to Break Code. Addison-Wesley, February 2004. | Cigital, Inc | 2007-01-01 |
Modifications | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Modifier | Organization | Date | Comments | ||
Gunnar Peterson | Cigital, Inc | 2007-02-28 | Fleshed out content to CAPEC schema from the original descriptions in "Exploiting Software" | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-03-09 | Review and revise | ||
Richard Struse | VOXEM, Inc | 2007-03-26 | Review and feedback leading to changes in Attack Prerequisites and Related Guidelines | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-04-13 | Modified pattern content according to review and feedback | ||
Romain Gaucher | Cigital, Inc | 2009-02-10 | Created draft content for detailed description | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital Federal, Inc | 2009-04-13 | Reviewed and revised content for detailed description |