Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements |
Attack Pattern ID: 18 (Standard Attack Pattern Completeness: Complete) | Typical Severity: Very High | Status: Draft |
Summary
This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags (<img>), comments in XML documents (< !-CDATA->), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through other elements.
As with all remote attacks, it is important to differentiate the ability to launch an attack (such as probing an internal network for unpatched servers) and the ability of the remote attacker to collect and interpret the output of said attack.
Attack Execution Flow
Spider:
Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all entry points for inputs that happen to be reflected in a client-side non-script element. These non-script elements can be located in the HTML content (head, body, comments), in an HTML tag, XML, CSS, etc.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non static links that are likely to have input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web application.
env-Web2 Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.
env-Web3 Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.
env-WebIndicators
ID type Indicator Description Environments 1 Positive At least one input is reflected in a non-script element.
env-Web2 Inconclusive Using URL rewriting, parameters may be part of the URL path and still used in a non-script element.
env-Web3 Inconclusive No parameters appear to be used on the current page. Even though none appear, the web application may still use them if they are provided.
env-Web4 Negative Applications that have only static pages or that simply present information without accepting input are unlikely to be susceptible.
env-WebOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success A list of URLs, with their corresponding parameters (POST, GET, COOKIE, etc.) is created by the attacker. These parameters are all used in, possibly, client-side non-scripts elements.2 Success A list of application user interface entry fields is created by the attacker.3 Success A list of resources accessed by the application is created by the attacker.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor velocity of page fetching in web logs. Humans who view a page and select a link from it will click far slower and far less regularly than tools. Tools make requests very quickly and the requests are typically spaced apart regularly (e.g. 0.8 seconds between them).2 Detective Create links on some pages that are visually hidden from web browsers. Using IFRAMES, images, or other HTML techniques, the links can be hidden from web browsing humans, but visible to spiders and programs. A request for the page, then, becomes a good predictor of an automated tool probing the application.3 Preventative Use CAPTCHA to prevent the use of the application by an automated tool.4 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be automated.
Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability:
The attacker uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side non-script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed. Since these probes may have to be injected in many different types of non-script elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML tag, XML, etc.).
env-Web2 Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side non-script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed. Since these probes may have to be injected in many different types of non-script elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML tag, XML, etc.).
env-Web3 Use a proxy tool to record results of the created requests.
env-WebIndicators
ID type Indicator Description Environments 1 Positive User-controllable input is output back to the browser
env-Web2 Positive Output to the browser is not encoded to remove executable scripting syntax.
env-WebOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success The attacker's script string is being reflected verbatim at some point in the web site (if not on the same page). Note that sometimes, the payload might be well encoded in the page, but wouldn't be encoded at all in some other section of the same web page (title, etc.)2 Failure All context-sensitive characters are consistently re-encoded before being sent to the web browser. For example, in a HTML tag element, the payload may not be able to evade the quotes in order to inject another attribute.3 Inconclusive Some sensitive characters are consistently encoded, but others are not. Depending on which type of non-script element the payload is injected in, it may be possible to evade the encodings.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor input to web servers (not only GET, but all potential inputs like COOKIES, POST, HEADER), application servers, and other HTTP infrastructure (e.g., load balancers). Alert on standard XSS probes. The majority of attackers use well known strings to check for vulnerabilities. Use the same vulnerability catalogs that hackers use.2 Preventative Apply appropriate input validation to filter all user-controllable input of scripting syntax3 Preventative Appropriately encode all browser output to avoid scripting syntax4 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be generating XSS probes.
Steal session IDs, credentials, page content, etc.:
As the attacker succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, he can choose to steal user's credentials in order to reuse or to analyze them later on.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and sends document information to the attacker.
env-Web2 Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.
env-WebOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success The attacker gets the user's cookies or other session identifiers.2 Success The attacker gets the content of the page the user is viewing.3 Success The attacker causes the user's browser to visit a page with malicious content.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor server logs for scripting parameters.2 Detective Monitor server logs for referrers. If users are being tricked into clicking XSS links through forums or other web postings, their web browsers will be providing Referrer headers most of the time. These can help indicate that the actual request is illegitimate.3 Preventative Apply appropriate input validation to filter all user-controllable input of scripting syntax4 Preventative Appropriately encode all browser output to avoid scripting syntax5 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be generating XSS probes.Forceful browsing:
When the attacker targets the current application or another one (through CSRF vulnerabilities), the user will then be the one who perform the attacks without being aware of it. These attacks are mostly targeting application logic flaws, but it can also be used to create a widespread attack against a particular website on the user's current network (Internet or not).
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and performs actions on the same web site
env-Web2 Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
env-WebOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success The attacker indirectly controls the user's browser and makes it performing actions exploiting CSRF.2 Success The attacker manipulates the browser through the steps that he designed in his attack. The user, identified on a website, is now performing actions he is not aware of.Security Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor server logs for scripting parameters.2 Detective Monitor server logs for referrers. If users are being tricked into clicking XSS links through forums or other web postings, their web browsers will be providing Referrer headers most of the time. These can help indicate that the actual request is illegitimate.3 Preventative Apply appropriate input validation to filter all user-controllable input of scripting syntax4 Preventative Appropriately encode all browser output to avoid scripting syntax5 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be generating XSS probes.Content spoofing:
By manipulating the content, the attacker targets the information that the user would like to get from the website.
Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description Environments 1 Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.
env-WebOutcomes
ID type Outcome Description 1 Success The user sees a page containing wrong informationSecurity Controls
ID type Security Control Description 1 Detective Monitor server logs for scripting parameters.2 Detective Monitor server logs for referrers. If users are being tricked into clicking XSS links through forums or other web postings, their web browsers will be providing Referrer headers most of the time. These can help indicate that the actual request is illegitimate.3 Preventative Apply appropriate input validation to filter all user-controllable input of scripting syntax4 Preventative Appropriately encode all browser output to avoid scripting syntax5 Preventative Actively monitor the application and either deny or redirect requests from origins that appear to be generating XSS probes.
Target client software must be a client that allows script execution based on scripts generated by remote hosts.
Description
In this example, the attacker adds script to HTML tags other than <script> tags, when the victim's standard content is appended with a malicious script. For example a link to http://myfavoritewebsite/getMyHomePage/content?malciousscript.js
The victim clicks on the link, which directs them to their home page (so that the victim does not notice anything is amiss) and simultaneously executes a script on their machine.
Skill or Knowledge Level: Low
To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an attacker can simply edit content such as XML payload or HTML files that are sent to client machine.
Skill or Knowledge Level: High
Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts into the browser's executable process.
Ability to include malicious script in document, e.g. HTML file, or XML document. Ability to deploy a custom hostile service for access by targeted clients. Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with client machine
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Service provider should not use the XMLHttpRequest method to create a local proxy for content from other sites, because the client will not be able to discern what content comes from which host.
Malicious input delivered through standard document formats, e.g. XML document or HTML file to the client.
Varies with instantiation of attack pattern. In the case of HTML files they may not be visible to the end user via a browser.
Enables attacker to execute scripts to launch attacks on remote client machine and environment
CWE-ID | Weakness Name | Weakness Relationship Type |
---|---|---|
79 | Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ('Cross-site Scripting') | Targeted |
80 | Improper Sanitization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS) | Targeted |
83 | Improper Neutralization of Script in Attributes in a Web Page | Targeted |
84 | Failure to Resolve Encoded URI Schemes in a Web Page | Secondary |
82 | Improper Sanitization of Script in Attributes of IMG Tags in a Web Page | Targeted |
348 | Use of Less Trusted Source | Targeted |
96 | Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection') | Targeted |
20 | Improper Input Validation | Targeted |
116 | Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output | Targeted |
184 | Incomplete Blacklist | Secondary |
86 | Improper Neutralization of Invalid Characters in Identifiers in Web Pages | Secondary |
350 | Improperly Trusted Reverse DNS | Targeted |
692 | Incomplete Blacklist to Cross-Site Scripting | Targeted |
697 | Insufficient Comparison | Targeted |
713 | OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A2 - Injection Flaws | Targeted |
71 | Apple '.DS_Store' | Targeted |
Nature | Type | ID | Name | Description | View(s) this relationship pertains to |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ChildOf | Attack Pattern | 63 | Simple Script Injection | Mechanism of Attack1000 | |
ChildOf | Attack Pattern | 242 | Script Injection | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ChildOf | Category | 341 | WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-08 - Cross-Site Scripting | WASC Threat Classification 2.0333 | |
PeerOf | Attack Pattern | 19 | Embedding Scripts within Scripts | Mechanism of Attack1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 32 | Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 86 | Embedding Script (XSS ) in HTTP Headers | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 91 | XSS in IMG Tags | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 106 | Cross Site Scripting through Log Files | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 198 | Cross-Site Scripting in Error Pages | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 199 | Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 209 | Cross-Site Scripting Using MIME Type Mismatch | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 243 | Cross-Site Scripting in Attributes | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 244 | Cross-Site Scripting via Encoded URI Schemes | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 245 | Cross-Site Scripting Using Doubled Characters, e.g. %3C%3Cscript | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 246 | Cross-Site Scripting Using Flash | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 247 | Cross-Site Scripting with Masking through Invalid Characters in Identifiers | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 |
Submissions | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Submitter | Organization | Date | ||
G. Hoglund and G. McGraw. Exploiting Software: How to Break Code. Addison-Wesley, February 2004. | Cigital, Inc | 2007-01-01 |
Modifications | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Modifier | Organization | Date | Comments | ||
Gunnar Peterson | Cigital, Inc | 2007-02-28 | Fleshed out content to CAPEC schema from the original descriptions in "Exploiting Software" | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-03-09 | Review and revise | ||
Richard Struse | VOXEM, Inc | 2007-03-26 | Review and feedback leading to changes in Name and Description | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-04-13 | Modified pattern content according to review and feedback | ||
Romain Gaucher | Cigital, Inc | 2009-02-10 | Created draft content for detailed description | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital Federal, Inc | 2009-04-13 | Reviewed and revised content for detailed description |