Oracle Outside In is a set of libraries that can decode over 500 different file formats. Originally written by Stellent, Outside In is now part of Oracle. The Oracle Outside In libraries are used by a variety of applications, including Microsoft Exchange, Oracle Fusion Middleware, Guidance Encase Forensics, AccessData FTK, and Novell Groupwise.

Outside In 8.3.7.77 and earlier fail to properly handle multiple file types when the data is malformed. The file types that have vulnerable parsers are: .VSD, .WSD, .JP2, .DOC, .SXD, .LWP, .PCX, .SXI, .DPT, .PDF, .SAM, .ODG, and .CDR.

The mapping of CVE identifiers to the relevant file parsers is as follows:
CDR: CVE-2012-1766
DOC: CVE-2012-1767
DPT: CVE-2012-1768
JP2: CVE-2012-1769
LWP: CVE-2012-1770
ODG: CVE-2012-1771
PCX: CVE-2012-1772
PDF: CVE-2012-1773
SAM: CVE-2012-3106
SXD: CVE-2012-3107
SXI: CVE-2012-3108
VSD: CVE-2012-3109
WSD: CVE-2012-3110

By causing an application to process a specially-crafted file with the Oracle Outside In library, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the vulnerable application. Depending on what application is using Outside In, this may happen as the result of some user interaction, such as single-clicking on a file, or it may happen with no user interaction at all.

Apply an update

These vulnerabilites are addressed in the Oracle Fusion Middleware Critical Patch Update July 2012. This update provides the Outside In library versions 8.3.7.171 and 8.3.5.6369. Please also consider the following workarounds.

Use the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit

The Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to help prevent exploitation of this and other vulnerabilities.

Enable DEP in Microsoft Windows

Consider enabling Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in supported versions of Windows. DEP should not be treated as a complete workaround, but it can mitigate the execution of attacker-supplied code in some cases. Microsoft has published detailed technical information about DEP in Security Research & Defense blog posts "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology" part 1 and part 2. DEP should be used in conjunction with the application of patches or other mitigations described in this document.

Note that when relying on DEP for exploit mitigation, it is important to use a system that supports Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as well. ASLR is not supported by Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 or earlier. ASLR was introduced with Microsoft Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. Please see the Microsoft SRD blog entry: On the effectiveness of DEP and ASLR for more details.