Improper Sanitization of Comment Delimiters |
| Weakness ID: 151 (Weakness Variant) | Status: Draft |
DescriptionDescription Summary
Time of Introduction- Implementation
Applicable PlatformsLanguages
All
Observed Examples| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE-2002-0001 | Mail client command execution due to improperly terminated comment in address list. |
| CVE-2004-0162 | MIE. RFC822 comment fields may be processed as other fields by clients. |
| CVE-2004-1686 | Well-placed comment bypasses security warning. |
| CVE-2005-1909 | Information hiding using a manipulation involving injection of comment code into product. Note: these vulnerabilities are likely vulnerable to more general XSS problems, although a regexp might allow ">!--" while denying most other tags. |
| CVE-2005-1969 | Information hiding using a manipulation involving injection of comment code into product. Note: these vulnerabilities are likely vulnerable to more general XSS problems, although a regexp might allow "<!--" while denying most other tags. |
Potential MitigationsDevelopers should anticipate that comments will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their software system. Use an appropriate combination of black lists and white lists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system. |
Phase: Architecture and Design Assume all input is malicious. Use a standard input validation mechanism to validate all input for length, type, syntax, and business rules before accepting the data to be displayed or stored. Use an "accept known good" validation strategy. |
Use and specify a strong output encoding (such as ISO 8859-1 or UTF 8). |
Do not rely exclusively on blacklist validation to detect malicious input or to encode output. There are too many variants to encode a character; you're likely to miss some variants. |
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated. Make sure that your application does not decode the same input twice. Such errors could be used to bypass whitelist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. |
Relationships| Nature | Type | ID | Name | View(s) this relationship pertains to |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |  Weakness Class | 138 | Improper Sanitization of Special Elements | Development Concepts (primary)699 Research Concepts (primary)1000 |
Taxonomy Mappings| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Comment Element |
Content History| Submissions | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | Source | |
| PLOVER | Externally Mined | |||
| Modifications | ||||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | Source | |
| 2008-07-01 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | External | |
| updated Potential Mitigations, Time of Introduction | ||||
| 2008-09-08 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings | ||||
| 2009-03-10 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
| updated Description, Name | ||||
| 2009-07-27 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | Internal | |
| updated Observed Examples, Potential Mitigations | ||||
| Previous Entry Names | ||||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | |||
| 2008-01-30 | Comment Element | |||
| 2008-04-11 | Failure to Remove Comment Element | |||
| 2009-03-10 | Failure to Sanitize Comment Element | |||
